Wednesday, November 10, 2010

Article 153 (yes, THAT one)

53 years on, we are still mired in Article 153
Lee Hwok Aun
Nov 10, 10

COMMENT This year, the 53rd since Malayan Independence, has heard numerous references to the 153rd Article of our constitution. People have weighed in from various angles, but stalemate persists because we keep repeating to the same positions.

A few bear mentioning. In March, the New Economic Model (Part 1) made cursory reference to the bumiputera special position and legitimate interests of other communities.

nurul izzah going for veep 230910 01The NEM is slouching somewhere between the prime minister's desk and oblivion.

But its proposal for some liberalisation flipped Ibrahim Ali and Perkasa into a rage, and they launched an offensive with Article 153 and "Malay rights" front of the arsenal.

Nurul Izzah Anwar (left), in her excellent "Malaysia or Malaysaja?" Merdeka Day essay, challenged Perkasa to a debate on Malay rights and its connection or lack thereof to Article 153. They declined.

Najib Tun Razak's speech to the UMNO general assembly reiterated the party's notions of social contract and special privileges embodied in a raft of constitutional articles, including 153.

Koh Tsu Koon, at Gerakan's annual convention last weekend, called for a more balanced execution of the dual provisions in Article 153 for special treatment for some, and legitimate interests of others.

Like all the above, I respect the constitution and do not challenge its contents. But I propose that we focus on a critical and more constructive, yet routinely overlooked, element of Article 153, which says that racial quotas may be used if necessary.

Racial quotas

Among thoughtful responses to the assertion that the Constitution guarantees Malay rights or privileges, three stand out.

First, we can emphasise the undisputable fact that it spells out "special position" instead of "special rights" or "special privileges".

What special position means exactly, is hard to say, and best left to legal scholars and philosophers.

Ordinary citizens, however, can sufficiently grasp that the notion of a special position does not necessarily translate into entitlements and supremacy.

I affirm the importance of the distinction, but at the end of the day, we are left with a semantic victory, often topped off with clarification that these provisions were initially intended to expire after 15 years, that fails to inform deeper questions.

The special position of the bumiputera, isolated from the rest of the text, can be taken to be permanent and limitless.

Second, we can focus on the "legitimate interests of other communities" alongside the bumiputera special position. This clause places some constraints on racial quotas, especially in terms of opportunities denied to non-bumiputera.

Again, the point is valid, but inadequate and divisive. It does not address whether quotas and reservations are justified and relevant, and it effectively pits bumiputera against non- bumiputera in perpetual conflict.

Communal battle cry

Some will always be game to refer to the list of richest Malaysians or the access of non-bumiputeras to private education as evidence that "legitimate interests" are accounted for. It's a spurious argument, but a politically useful distraction and communal battle cry.

federal constitution on status of malays 030507 article 153A third response highlights Article 153's limitation of quotas and reservations to public sector employment, scholarships, permits and licenses.

Thus, equity and property quotas are out - they were never there in the first place.

While technically correct, this is another treacherous path to tread, because it implies that racial quotas are constitutionally permanent as long as they are confined to public universities, public sector employment and licensing.

Yet these are arguably the areas that stifle bumiputera advancement the most, especially with the decline of public education institutions.

I am not calling for elimination of affirmative action, but for a reconsideration of how we can better pursue both equitable racial representation and excellence.

Lamentably, this discussion gets tossed out the window if we take Article 153 to mean bumiputera education quotas forever, or if we remain content to let public bodies be the domain of bumiputera special position while private bodies satisfy other groups' legitimate interests.

So how else can we read the law?

For a start, instead of extracting select bits, let's read in full the section that sets out Article 153 in practice: "the Yang Di-Pertuan Agong shall exercise his functions under this Constitution and federal law in such manner as may be necessary to safeguard the special position of the Malays and natives of any of the States of Sabah and Sarawak and to ensure the reservation for Malays and natives of any of the States of Sabah and Sarawak of such proportion as he may deem reasonable of positions in the public service,... scholarships,... and permits and licenses." (italics added).

No absolute mandate

Article 153 does not confer an absolute mandate or obligation to apply racial reservations and quotas, but establishes those possibilities "in such manner as may be necessary".

In other words, the constitution does not stipulate that quotas must be enforced no matter what, but quotas may be instituted if necessary.

It is implied that this assessment of necessity must be grounded in productive activity, not wealth acquisition.

A further implication is that racial quotas and reservations are contingent on evaluating whether circumstances warrant such measures and whether those programmes have attained a reasonable degree of success rendering them unnecessary.

I believe this is a more constructive focal point for deliberating the relevance and effectiveness of racial quotas.

Of course, there is still ambiguity and room for debate on determining "necessity". That's the world for you. Deeply rooted national dilemmas are complex and cannot be completely codified in law or simplistically propagated - except if dictated by powers that be.

The difference in focusing on the "as may be necessary" clause is that it compels the debate to be informed and inclusive, to strive for objectivity and constructiveness.

After all these years, it seems we cannot get over Article 153.

No, not when we haven't even gotten into it.

Strive for the fairest mechanism in wage consultation

Prime Minister Datuk Seri Najib Razak has acknowledged that the era of government knows best is over. Now we need the government to know better.

The government should know better than to declare the end to “government knows best” but then flash a megaproject pageant that we are supposed to agree upon because the government says it’s good for you and me.

The lack of government knowing better is not confined to the hot button topics like the Warisan Merdeka tower only. The formation of a National Wage Consultation Council — before any debate or passage of laws that establish its existence — is another example.

The government has stated that a bill will be tabled in parliament in March next year along with an amount approved by the cabinet. The minimum wage could be implemented from June or July. But shouldn’t these dates be determined by the yet-to-be established council? Moreover, if the council is formed and cabinet endorses a minimum wage amount in the same month, what exactly is the role of the council? Will it consult members in the same way that the rakyat were consulted in drafting the budget?

The Malaysian Employers Federation (MEF) thinks the council is a good idea. The MEF has been the most strident opponent of minimum wage. The response from the Malaysian Trade Union Congress, on the other hand, has been guarded and tepid, and legitimately so. Organised labour’s leeriness towards government overtures on minimum wage is grounded in five decades of broken promises.

If we are going to do minimum wage, let us do it right. For a start, do not name this prospective body the National Wage Consultation Council. There should be more discussion if the body should be in the form of a council or an independent commission. Tentatively, it should be referred as the minimum wage setting body.

Let us also adopt a global perspective and consider the experience of countries that have implemented them before us. We ought to examine minimum wage setting bodies in high-income countries, especially recent entrants like South Korea and Poland.

There are three crucial elements that determine the fairness and efficacy of a minimum wage setting body. First, who will chair it? An independent person or the minister of human resources? Various national councils are also chaired by the prime minister. If so, then political considerations will inescapably come to bear. The extent minimum wage reflects national opinion will hinge on the level of democratic maturity. So it is probably not a good idea for a politician to chair the body.

Second, and related to the above, will it operate independently or under the supervision of the ministry? We owe it to low-wage workers and employers to consider establishing an independent commission to determine minimum wage and to operate without influence of government, though of course with due incorporation of government policy objectives.

We should take a good look at the UK’s Low Pay Commission, which produces detailed annual reports and recommendations, or South Korea’s Minimum Wage Council, which comprises equal numbers of representatives of employers, employees and independent persons — no government seats.

Third, will it set the minimum wage or make recommendations to the government? In most countries, the minimum wage setting body makes recommendations but the government ultimately decides. In some countries, the relevant council, commission or committee determines, directly or indirectly, the legally binding wage floor.

If two-thirds of South Korea’s Minimum Wage Council approve a minimum wage increase, the minister of labour is obligated to accept the proposal even if he or she disagrees.

Poland’s Tripartite Commission operates on the principle of consensus, and once that is reached, a new minimum wage becomes law. If consensus fails, the government still cannot implement minimum wage below the commission’s proposal.

We should approach these questions from the standpoint that, since minimum wage is principally about fairness, we must strive for the fairest mechanism. Start with the case for a fully independent commission that determines the wage floor and work out compromises from there.

We must establish this body first, then let it deliberate parameters and mechanisms for setting minimum wage, then only set the rate. Whether we have a national rate or regional variations should also be up to the body to decide. These discussions take time and energy, but if the government is sincere and fully committed about minimum wage, a thorough and strenuous process is right and necessary.

Rushing the creation of a national wage consultation council and a cabinet-stamped minimum wage guarantees premature birth. Worse still, we might institutionalise mechanisms as ineffective and powerless as the wage councils that have been in existence since the Wage Councils Act of 1947.

The government should know better than to let minimum wage, a vital instrument in our quest to reduce poverty and raise incomes, fall victim to rash policy.

This article was first published in The Edge (November 4, 2010)